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Abstract 
We study the nature of home bias in online 
employment, wherein the employer prefers workers 
from his/her own home country. Using a unique large-
scale dataset from one of the major online labor 
platforms, we identify employers’ home bias in their 
online employment decisions. Moreover, we investigate 
the cause of employers’ home bias using a quasi-natural 
experiment wherein the platform introduces a 
monitoring system to facilitate employers to keep track 
of workers’ progress in time-based projects. After 
matching comparable fixed-price projects as a control 
group using propensity score matching, our difference-
in-difference estimations show that the home bias does 
exist in online employment, and at least 54.0% of home 
bias is driven by statistical discrimination. 
 
1. Introduction  
Firms usually make employment decisions under 
high uncertainty due to information asymmetry [1]. 
Such decision uncertainty leads employers to employ 
heuristics to help infer workers’ capability and diligence 
[2, 3]. Two heuristics commonly examined in the 
literature are discrimination based on the racial group 
membership and that based on gender. For example, 
employers were found to prefer white workers to black 
workers (the minority group), even though they have the 
same observable characteristics [4]. While the single-
directional discrimination against minority groups is 
well-known, little prior research has considered another 
form of discrimination - the minority group could have 
a preference for applicants from the same minority 
group. A notable example demonstrating the importance 
of the matching between managers and workers is that 
managers at Oracle, most of whom are Asians, were 
involved in a lawsuit because of their discrimination 
against qualified white workers and in favor of Asians 
who were belonged to the minority group in the previous 
discrimination literature.1 This anecdote underscores 
that sometimes it is the similarity or closeness between 
                                                
1 http://fortune.com/2017/01/18/labor-department-oracle/ 
two parties playing a critical role in determining the 
discrimination pattern and the employment choice.  
The literature has documented such discrimination 
as “home bias,” which is a preference for parties with 
shorter geographic distance [5]. Home bias has been 
extensively documented, in areas such as portfolio 
management [6], P2P lending [7], various products from 
the same city [5]. The existence of home bias is 
plausible yet potentially detrimental in employment 
settings. For one thing, home bias tends to lower the 
diversity of the employees [8], which in turn lowers the 
creativity [9]. For another, home bias also adds friction 
to the labor markets and serves as one type of 
unconscious biases that makes the employment 
decisions unfair to some workers [4]. Important as the 
question is, there is little academic evidence 
documenting home bias in employment. And the lack of 
evidence is not surprising, given the geographic 
homogeneity of workers in the offline employment 
relationship. In this paper, we seek to fill this gap and 
investigate the discrimination based on the similarity of 
home country by using a unique data set from the online 
employment setting, wherein we are able to reliably 
observe both the employer and workers’ countries.  
The literature has offered explanations for the home 
bias, in particular, for investment portfolios and 
international trade [10]. Generally, these explanations 
could be classified as two forms of bias, namely, 
statistical/rational discrimination [11, 12] and taste-
based discrimination [7, 13]. Specifically, statistical 
discrimination refers to decision makers’ higher 
preference for domestic portfolios or trade because of 
the associated higher expected utility inferred based on 
individual-specific and group-specific signals [14, 15]. 
In contrast, taste-based discrimination comes from the 
pre-existing liking for domestic portfolios or trade, 
which is not related to the signal exaction or utility 
function [16]. Based on the extant literature, the home 
bias in investment portfolios might be driven by 
statistical or taste-based discrimination. Specifically, it 
could come from established institutional factors [17], 
investors’ rational desire to hedge specific sources of 
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risk [11], or simply their reluctance to share risks with 
foreigners [13]. However, in the employment setting, 
these concerns about risk hedging or risk sharing do not 
appear applicable. Additionally, studies in international 
trade suggest that international trade barriers [12, 18], 
localized consumption of the goods and the possibility 
of direct contract enforcement [5] are the major rational 
explanations for a home bias. However, because 
typically there is little barrier to entry for users from 
different countries and well-established platform 
arbitration in online labor markets, these explanations 
do not appear to apply either. Meanwhile, home bias in 
employment also differs from the home bias in the 
financial markets or trade because of its information 
distribution characteristics. To be specific, unlike the 
financing or trade decision, the employment decision is 
plagued with both the salient ex ante and ex post 
information asymmetry. On the one hand, in such a 
highly risky context, decision makers tend to elaborate 
more on the potential economic outcomes and be less 
likely to solely rely on simple heuristics. On the other 
hand, more asymmetric information might render the 
employment decision more effortful and resource-
consuming, and subsequently strengthen managers’ 
reliance on heuristics, especially when the number of 
worker candidates is high and most of them are similar 
in some aspects. Therefore, the existence of home bias 
is more unpredictable and complex in the employment 
scenario. Bearing the above in mind, we seek to extend 
the literature in home bias by examining employment 
decisions in online labor markets [19, 20] and 
specifically, we address the following two research 
questions:  
• Q1 (existence): Is there home bias towards workers 
based on nationality in online labor markets?  
• Q2 (mechanism): If so, what drives home bias in 
this market? Is such home bias based on statistical 
discrimination or taste-based discrimination?  
In this study, we identify the existence of and 
explore the potential mechanism for employment home 
bias by leveraging a natural experiment -- the initial 
implementation of a monitoring system in 
Freelancer.com. This event serves as an exogenous 
shock to the level of information asymmetry by 
reducing worker hidden actions. Based on the different 
theoretical predictions of corresponding mechanisms, 
we seek to identify the underlying mechanism of 
discrimination. Specifically, on the one hand, because 
of the monitoring system lower employers’ reliance on 
group-specific signal extraction by alleviating the ex 
post individual-specific information, the 
implementation of the monitoring system should lower 
the home bias driven by statistical discrimination. On 
the other hand, taste-based home bias should not be 
affected by the change in individual information 
availability and remain constant. Our econometric 
identification hinges on the fact that the monitoring 
system is only applicable to time-based contracts 
(online employment contracts) but not to fixed-price 
contracts (the sale contracts of outsourcing service), 
which allows us to use time-based contracts as the 
treatment group and fixed-price contracts as the control 
group. Based on a unique large-scale dataset from one 
of the prevalent online labor markets, we document the 
existence of home bias towards workers in the 
employment setting. Further, our result suggests that at 
least 54.0% of employers’ home bias is statistical-based. 
Our paper contributes to the stream of literature in 
two ways. First, our study is among the first to 
investigate the existence of home bias in the 
employment setting and explore the discrimination 
mechanism with a quasi-natural experiment. It extends 
previous equity or trade home bias research, which 
mainly focuses on decisions under ex ante information 
asymmetry, to the employment decision threatened by 
both ex ante and ex post information asymmetry. Also, 
given that the online employment context provides us a 
rare opportunity to explore the home bias without the 
mixture of social referrals or organization culture, this 
paper advances the employment discrimination research 
by demonstrating the impact of the similarity between 
the managers and workers. Second, our paper adds to 
our understanding of potential discrimination in the 
“Gig” economy. During the last few years, “Gig” 
economy platforms provide the digital infrastructure 
that connects demand and on-demand service and brings 
reorganization of a wide variety of traditional markets. 
However, even though the “Gig” economy seems to 
provide a “frictionless” avenue of low entry barrier for 
the two-sided matching, some emerging research 
suggests that it also develops into a breeding ground of 
“racial discrimination” [21, 22], which is legally banned 
in the traditional markets but is out of reach of such 
antidiscrimination laws [22-24]. Our study showcases 
the existence of another type of discrimination, home 
bias, and suggests that platforms’ information policies 
such as monitoring could help to alleviate the statistical 
home bias. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Home bias 
Home bias has been reported in multiple contexts, 
such as financial markets [7, 25-27] and trade [5, 12, 18, 
20]. Many papers on home bias focus on offline contexts 
[10]. For instance, Lewis [13] finds that the reluctance 
to share the international risk helps to explain the 
observed “equity-home-bias”. Moreover, Coval and 
Moskowitz [6] suggest that the home bias phenomenon 
is not only limited to the preference for the equity at the 
home country, but also can be presented as the 
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preference for equity in a shorter geographic distance 
without crossing the country borders.  
As the development of online trade and online 
financial markets, recent work starts to explore whether 
the geography-based preference still holds in the online 
setting. Specifically, most the related studies focus on 
how the geography-based explanation and culture 
factors might lead to home bias. On the one hand, some 
studies suggest that the shorter geographic distance per 
se is associated with a higher preference because of 
rational considerations or pre-existing taste. For 
instance, Hortaçsu et al. [5] find that the city-limits, 
goods needed to locally consume, the possibility of 
contract enforcement and cultural factors might jointly 
contribute to the concentration of local trade on eBay. 
Lin and Viswanathan [7] explore the home bias in online 
peer-to-peer markets and find it might be driven by 
taste-based preference. On the other hand, there is also 
a stream of literature suggesting that the culture factor 
plays an important role in the country-level home bias. 
However, the extant findings of the mechanism of 
culture-related home country bias are still mixed. For 
instance, Ghani et al. [20] find that Indians show 
ethnical discrimination when making the outsourcing 
decisions. Moreover, Gefen and Carmel [19] find that 
most employers prefer to purchase the outsourcing 
service from parties in their home countries. Burtch et 
al. [28] suggest that there exists a substitutional 
relationship between cultural differences and physical 
distance in the online pro-social lending context. 
Overall, the afore-mentioned explanations and the 
mechanisms of home bias are still inclusive [7, 13]. 
Additionally, given that the rich literature on of home 
bias in the online and offline financial markets and 
trade, none of the previous literature explore the home 
bias in the employment setting. 
Regarding the methodology of home bias, scholars 
tend to employ different methods according to their 
levels of analysis. When the available data is at the 
macro-level, a typical test would be the gravity equation 
[29]. Similar to a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
the gravity equation is a power function of the distance 
between two parties, the economy volume traded 
between two parties and other related factors. This 
method is more applicable to the macro economy 
research, especially the trading between two countries 
or cities. When micro-level data is accessible, some 
alternative methods would be the choice models [20] or 
the potential-dyads approach used in Lin and 
Viswanathan [7]. Specifically, when the decision 
makers’ consideration sets are not well-specified, 
potential dyads analysis enables scholars to include all 
the available alternatives into the model and explore 
whether the decision makers have a stronger preference 
for parties from their home country [25].  
2.2. Mechanisms of Discrimination 
Discrimination is derived from the information 
asymmetry between workers and employers in online 
labor markets. Given the limited information regarding 
workers’ capability and effort, employers rely on the 
observable signal to extrapolate the individual workers’ 
characteristics. There are a lot of mechanisms proposed 
by researchers to explain the discrimination. Based on 
the decision rule, discrimination can be classified as 
rational/statistical discrimination and taste-based 
discrimination [30]. Specifically, rational or statistical 
discrimination means employers are profit-maximizing 
actors, who use the group-specific signal to infer the 
characteristics of individual workers [15]. For instance, 
if the employer learns that domestic workers are more 
skillful and diligent based on his/her private 
information, he/she might use the country as the signal 
to infer the workers’ quality later, given the limited 
information and cognitive resource. On the other hand, 
taste-based discrimination captures employers’ pure 
preference which does not involve any rational 
inference or the utility function [16, 20, 31].  
Regarding how to disentangle statistical 
discrimination from the taste-based counterpart, the 
most common method employed in the previous 
discrimination literature is comparing the different gaps 
between groups under different scenarios [32] and 
verifying the predictions. Generally, it could be 
classified into two types of predictions, namely, the 
static and dynamic predictions [33]. First, the static 
predictions are about the static difference across 
between-group pairs when other observable 
productivity characteristics are unfavorable or favorable 
[32]. In line with this logic, we could predict that 
statistical discrimination would be weaker when 
between-group parties with high observable 
productivity characteristics are compared, while the 
magnitude of discrimination would be stronger when 
between-group parties with low observable productivity 
characteristics are compared. Second, the dynamic 
prediction refers to the prediction about when and how 
the discrimination within the similar pairs of minor and 
non-minor groups will change [33]. For instance, when 
people can have chances to correct their beliefs because 
of the market competition or more information is 
available, they are expected to change accordingly if 
they hold statistical discrimination [31]. For instance, 
Rubineau and Kang [20] state that the medical training 
should help students to learn to obtain more hard-to-
observe characteristics and lower their statistical 
discrimination. However, they observe that students 
tend to show a strong discrimination after a year of 
training, which suggests that it is not statistical 
discrimination that drives the racial disparities [19]. 
Based on the dynamic predictions of statistical 
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discrimination, information changes such as the 
removal of gender information [34] or criminal 
background information [35] will lead to a change in the 
magnitude of discrimination. On the whole, checking 
the result if it is consistent with the dynamic prediction 
is an emerging way to identify statistical discrimination. 
2.3. Online Labor Markets and Contract Types 
Online labor markets facilitate the purchase of on-
demand labor services across the borders of cities or 
countries [36]. Generally, in online labor markets, there 
are two prevalent ways to buy service from unknown 
parties, namely, sales contracts (fixed-price contracts) 
or employment contracts (time-based contracts) [37, 
38]. Sales contracts (fixed-price contracts) are outcome-
driven, and the agent gets a fixed payment until he/she 
can provide a given amount of output [39]. On the other 
hand, employment contracts (time-based contracts), 
also named as cost-plus contracts, require that the 
payment should be calculated based on the worker’s 
hourly wage and his/her actual work time in the work 
process [39]. Because usually workers’ compensation is 
not depending on their performance in time-based 
projects,  moral hazard issues related to ex-post 
information asymmetries (e.g. their actual effort spent 
on the projects) tend to pose a big threat to incentive 
design and employers’ benefit. Moral hazard problems 
are prevalent in the traditional offline employment 
relationship and online employment relationship 
wherein the problems might be even more serious 
because of the spatial and temporal separation between 
employers and workers.  
When information about workers’ characteristics is 
limited and hard to observe, one way to reduce the 
uncertainty of employment decision is statistical 
inference [2, 3]. For instance, by combining the average 
characteristics of the specific group and the observable 
individual information, employers can better predict 
workers’ behaviors, which might lead to statistical 
discrimination [40]. It is also found that sometimes 
statistical discrimination might help to increase 
efficiency [41]. Another major way to reduce moral 
hazard problems by reducing ex post information 
asymmetries is acquiring more actual performance 
information, such as monitoring [42]. By tracking and 
verifying workers’ behaviors, monitoring could provide 
more procedural progress information and alleviate 
employers’ uncertainty about workers’ shirking [43]. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. Employers’ Home Bias 
When monitoring systems are not available, 
employers bear a high moral hazard risk. Specifically, 
given that the spatial and temporal separation between 
employers and workers, it is costly for employers to 
overcome the difference in time zones and collect the 
information to infer workers’ efforts. Moreover, even 
when employers are willing to spend enough time and 
effort to manually monitor workers’ work flows, it is 
unlikely that employers could monitor workers’ 
performance precisely. As such, relational contracting 
or “process-based trust” [44] might serve a more cost-
efficient way to lower the moral hazard risk. Here, trust 
is defined as one decision maker’s specific level of 
subjective probability with which another party will 
implement a desirable action before the actual action is 
monitored or verified [45, 46]. According to Gulati’s 
[46], perceived familiarity could breed the cognitive and 
emotional base of trust, which helps to alleviate the 
moral hazard concern and leads to a preference in the 
employment choice. Given that employers tend to feel 
more familiar with domestic workers [46], they will be 
more likely to develop a higher level of initial trust in 
domestic workers. Therefore, assuming that employers 
are rational and trying to maximizing their profits from 
the employment relationship, perceived familiarity and 
trust might be employed by them to lower the risk and 
uncertainty. Additionally, the preference for domestic 
workers might be subliminal. According to the “mere 
exposure theory” [47], people tend to show a stronger 
liking for something that is familiar to them without 
notice. As such, it is possible that employers would 
prefer domestic workers, even when foreign workers 
have the comparable productivity. Since the risk is 
mainly allocated on employers who are faced with both 
hidden information issues and hidden action (moral 
hazard) issues [48], employers may more rely on trust 
or familiarity to lower their uncertainty or risk. 
Therefore, based on the rational tradeoff or subliminal 
preference, employers would prefer hiring domestic 
workers, especially in time-based projects. 
H1: Ceteris paribus, employers prefer workers from 
their home countries in online employment (time-based 
projects) relative to the sale contracts of outsourcing 
service (fixed-price projects).  
3.2. The Impact of Information Change on Home 
Bias 
With the implementation of the monitoring system, 
employers can reduce their uncertainty by monitoring, 
rely less on the trust-based relational contracting [48], 
and reduce their home bias. First, the monitoring system 
helps to alleviate hidden action issues and decrease 
workers’ probability to shirk. When the monitoring 
system could automatically take screenshots and keep 
the log files of the project progress for employers to 
check anytime, both the shirking probability of foreign 
workers and that of domestic workers are reduced to a 
similarly low level. As such, the monitoring system 
serves as a prime example of process control mechanism 
and substitutes for relational contracting [49]. 
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Moreover, owing to the precise monitoring records, 
employers could provide more timely and specific 
instructions for workers to help them perform more 
efficiently. Specifically, regardless of workers’ home 
countries and their trustworthiness, employers could 
keep their cost uncertainty low and ensure their own 
profit from the projects. In other words, when employers 
try to lower their cost uncertainty in a platform with the 
monitoring system already available, they could more 
tend to rely on monitoring instead of signal exaction 
from both the group-specific and the individual-specific 
signals [50]. In other words, the implementation of the 
monitoring system serves as an exogenous information 
change by lowing the ex post information asymmetry 
and reducing the shirking risk, which is expected to 
decrease statistical discrimination (if there is any). 
Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2:  The implementation of the monitoring system 
can mitigate employers’ preference towards workers 
from their home countries in online employment (time-
based projects) relative to the sale contracts of 
outsourcing service (fixed-price projects). 
 
4. Research methodology 
4.1. Data 
We obtained a dataset from www.freelancer.com 
(Freelancer), one of the largest online labor market 
platforms. On this platform, the employer can post a 
project, including its description, the budget and 
required skills, among others. In particular, the 
employer may specify the project as a fixed-price 
project by outsourcing it at a flat price (Figure 1-a), or a 
time-based project (an employment contract) by paying 
hourly wages to the hired worker (Figure 1-b).  Workers 
could browse all the active or ongoing projects on the 
website and selectively bid for some of them. Due to the 
limit on the number of bids one can submit each month2, 
workers may select projects that maximize their 
expected total rewards on the projects they are likely to 
win. Finally, a contract is reached if the employer 
assigns the project to one or more workers3 and the 
contractor accepts the offer.  
To rule out the effect of the auction format on 
employers’ choices, we limit our analysis to projects 
using the most common public auction form4. Further, 
to construct a homogenous project sample, we focus on 
the most popular project category, i.e., “IT, software & 
website”. The descriptive statistics of our final dataset 
are shown in Tables 1 and 2. The dataset includes the 
                                                
2 Free members could submit 8 bids per month. Golden members 
could submit more. However, the percentage of golden members in 
our dataset is less than 0.1%. 
3 All these projects with more than one winners are dropped from our 
sample.  
following attributes: 1) user-level characteristics (e.g., 
the number of reviews, the nationality, and the tenure of 
a user measured in months); project-level characteristics 
(the description, the budget, the type of contract, the 
number of bidders and the average bid price, who was 
awarded and so on). 
Table 1. Definitions Workers’ Characteristics 
Variable Variable definition 
Bid Price The bid price posted by the worker 
Milestone percentage A feature provided by Freelancer, it denotes 
the percentage of controlled payments paid 
to the worker during the project 
Bidder tenure month the worker's tenure at Freelancer measured 
in months 
Homecountry A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the worker 
and the employer live in the same country  
Bid order rank The sequence order of the worker’s bid 
Preferred freelancer A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the worker 
won the “Preferred Freelancer Badge” 
Bidder developed A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the worker 
comes from a developed country 
Count rating The number of reviews entered by previous 
employers 
Table 2. Definitions of Project Characteristics 
Variable  Variable definition 
Time_based A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the project is a 
time-based project; =0 if it is a fixed-price 
project 
Log (employer 
overall rating) 
The average overall contractor-entered ratings 
for the employer (log-transformed) 
Language Eng A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the project is 
described in English 
Log (paid amount) Amount of dollars paid by the employer after the 
project was completed (log-transformed) 
Log (budget max) The maximum of bid prices for this project set by 
the employer (log-transformed) 
Log (title length) Number of characters in the project title (log-
transformed) 
Log (description 
length) 
Number of characters in the project description 
posted by the employer (log-transformed) 
Employer developed A dummy variable (0,1), =1 if the employer 
comes from a developed country 
4.2. Identification: a quasi-natural experiment 
On February 5th, 2014, Freelancer rolled out its 
monitoring system for the first time, which enables 
employers to conveniently monitor the progress of time-
based projects. Such a monitoring system automatically 
takes screenshots and keeps track of workers’ effort 
input. As a result, workers couldn’t shirk or 
intentionally finish the time-based projects in a low 
demanding way. Specifically, since the monitoring 
system is mandatory for all time-based projects and is 
not available for fixed-price projects, we use the fixed-
price projects as the control group and the time-based 
projects as the treatment group.  
4 In such a case, projects like special contracts with NDA, featured 
projects, sealed projects, fulltime jobs, those using the non-dollar 
currency, those written in non-English are dropped from our sample.	
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Figure 1. A Timeline of the Observation Window 
According to the previous literature on statistical 
discrimination [15] and taste-based discrimination [16], 
two distinct predictions can be made based on different 
assumptions about the underlying mechanisms of home 
bias. For one thing, since statistical discrimination is 
contingent on the availability of individual-specific 
information, monitoring might lower the need for 
information extraction based on group-specific signals 
and hence lower the extent of statistical home bias. For 
another, given that taste-based discrimination is merely 
based on preference, which is irrelevant to the 
availability of information and the expected 
productivity. Therefore, the implementation of the 
monitoring system might affect statistical 
discrimination but not taste-based discrimination. If 
statistic discrimination is at work, we may observe a 
significant decrease in the level of home bias. Therefore, 
we proposed the following predictions:  
Table 3. Types of Discrimination and Predictions 
Forms of 
Discrimination 
Dynamic Predictions about the 
Change in Home Bias 
Statistical 
discrimination 
After the implementation of the monitoring 
system, employers’ home bias decreases in 
the treatment group, as compared to the 
control group 
Taste-based 
discrimination 
After the implementation of the monitoring 
system, employers’ home bias remains 
unchanged in the treatment group, as 
compared to the control group 
5. Measures and models 
5.1. Propensity Score Matching 
To generate a more comparable sample, we deploy the 
propensity score matching method to match fixed-price 
projects with time-based projects [51-54]. Specifically, 
we identify project characteristics and employer 
characteristics which might be associated with the 
contract type [38, 53, 55, 56]. Then, we match fixed-
price projects with time-based projects according to the 
estimated propensity score. Further, we conduct a 
balance check of all the observed covariates [54] and 
find that the mean values of these covariates are not 
significantly different between the two groups. Our final 
sample includes 5,223 fixed-price projects and 5,223 
time-based projects. 
                                                
5 Since we employ one-to-one matching without replacement, all the 
means of month dummies are equal. Because of the limitation of 
length, the complete list of the t-test of month dummies is suppressed 
for brevity.   
Table 4. Balance Check for PSM 
Covariates Variables Mean Treated Control 
Project 
description [53] 
Description length 16.33 16.40 
Title length 5.77 5.81 
Project size [53] Paid amount 250.25 286.15 
Environment 
change [38] Month dummies
5 0.04 0.04 
Client’s 
knowledge [53] 
Employer tenure month 729.31 728.75 
Employer overall rating 4.89 4.90 
 
Covariates %bias t-test 
V(T)/ 
V(C) 
t p>t  
Project description [53] -1.70 -0.87 0.38 1.19* -1.20 -0.63 0.53 1.09* 
Project size [53] -1.00 -1.42 0.16 1.04 
Environment change 
[38] 0.00 0.00 1.00 . 
Client’s knowledge [53] 0.10 0.03 0.97 0.94* -1.00 -0.46 0.65 0.83* 
 
 6. Measures and Models 
6.1. Employers’ Decision  
We estimate the coefficients of the dummy variable !"#$country,-  on the decision of employers before 
and after the implementation of the monitoring system 
based on a linear probability model (LPM) with project-
level fixed-effects and a conditional logit model. Taking 
the Logit model as an example, the probability of the 
employer of project i assigns a project to bidder j is Pr	(12"3$45,_78729_:;99$2-) and the utility that the 
employer of project i obtains from hiring bidder j is 
constructed as follows: U	(12"3$45,_78729_:;99$2-) = ?, + AB!"#$country,- +AC!"#$country,-×E;#$_:7F$9, + AGHI5$2,×!"#$country,- + AJHI5$2,×!"#$country,-×E;#$_:7F$9, + 4"K52"LF(M;99$2-) + N,-			                             (1)                                                               
where ?, means the project-level fixed effect. 
Specifically, the employer-level fixed effects are nested 
within the project-level fixed effects. !"#$country,- 
denotes whether the employer of project i and bidder j 
are from the same country. 4"K52"LF(M;99$2-)	 include 
various bidders’ related characteristics6. N,- is assumed 
to follow the type-I extreme value distribution [57]. A 
significantly positive effect of !"#$country,- prior to 
the implementation of monitoring systems (captured by AB 	+ AC) suggests that employers hold home bias. 
Moreover, based on our previous discussions, if AJ is 
significantly negative, we could conclude that 
employers adjust their home bias according to the 
6 Within data, a contractor’s average rating is almost constant during 
our observational period. Therefore, we didn’t treat the contractor 
rating as a time-variant variable here.  
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information change and there exists statistical 
discrimination [33].  
6.2. Empirical Result 
Based on the results of LPM and the Logit model, both 
the coefficients of !"#$country,- (AB) and !"#$country,-×E;#$_:7F$9,	(AC) are significantly 
positive, which indicates that employers are more 
willing to hire workers from their home countries, 
especially for time-based contracts. Hence, Hypothesis 
1 is supported. Moreover, the coefficient of HI5$2,×!"#$country,-	(AG) is not significant, which suggests 
that we don’t have a weak control problem. As expected, 
the coefficient of the HI5$2,×!"#$country,-×E;#$_:7F$9, (AJ) is significantly negative, which 
suggests that, for time-based projects, employers’ 
additional preference for bidders from their home 
countries decreases as more ex post individual-specific 
information is accessible through the monitoring 
system. This lends support to Hypothesis 2. 
To better understand the strength and the economic 
value of home bias, next we examine the sizes of related 
coefficients. Specifically, we focus on the coefficients 
in the Logit model due to the nature of the decision 
process. Before the implementation of the monitoring 
system, the total effect of !"#$country,- is 0.801 ( AB 	+ AC 	= 0.323 + 0.478 = 0.801)	while the 
coefficient of log (bid price) is -1.592. In this sense, 
employers are willing to pay 65.4% (exp(0.801/1.592)-
1= 1.654-1=0.654) more to domestic workers than to 
foreign workers, all else equal. Given that the average 
hourly wage of winners in time-based projects is 26.23 
dollars, the effect of home bias translates to a premium 
of 17.15 dollars for domestic workers. However, after 
the deployment of the monitoring system, the effect of !"#$country,- reduces to 0.419, implying that 
domestic workers can still charge 30.1%7 more as 
compared to foreign workers, all else equal. In other 
words, the economic value of !"#$country,- 
decreases to 7.90 dollars8. Since only the level of 
statistical discrimination may decrease due to the 
availability of ex post individual-specific information, 
our finding demonstrates that roughly 54.0%9 of home 
bias is driven by statistical discrimination. Given that 
monitoring is very likely to be imperfect and it could not 
help to alleviate the ex ante information asymmetry, 
employers may still, to some extent, perform statistical 
discrimination after the implementation of the 
monitoring system. Therefore, our estimate of the 
percentage of home bias driven by statistical 
                                                
7 exp(0.419/1.592)-1= 1.301-1=0.301 
8 26.23*30.1%=7.90 
discrimination is probably relatively conservative. To 
sum up, both Hypotheses 1 and 2 are supported. 
Table 5. Estimation Results of LPM and Logit  
Sample Full sample Matched sample 
Model LPM   Logit LPM    Logit  
Homecountry 0.023*** 0.368*** 0.022*** 0.323*** 
 (0.005) (0.064) (0.008) (0.107) 
Time_based× 
Homecountry 0.061*** 0.458*** 0.061*** 0.478*** 
 (0.016) (0.152) (0.018) (0.175) 
After×Homecountry 0.008 0.102 0.009 0.127 
 (0.006) (0.076) (0.010) (0.131) 
Time_based ×After ×Homecountry -0.052*** -0.443** -0.047** -0.382* 
 (0.019) (0.192) (0.021) (0.221) 
Log bid price -0.082*** -1.707*** -0.080*** -1.592*** 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.025) 
Bidder developed 0.029*** 0.477*** 0.029*** 0.475*** 
 (0.001) (0.022) (0.002) (0.036) 
Log milestone 
percentage -0.005*** -0.107*** -0.012*** -0.243*** 
 (0.001) (0.014) (0.001) (0.020) 
Log count rating 0.016*** 0.374*** 0.018*** 0.378*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.009) 
Log_bid_order_rank -0.008*** -0.186*** -0.006*** -0.148*** 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.016) 
Preferred freelancer 0.007*** 0.113*** 0.007*** 0.108*** 
 (0.001) (0.016) (0.002) (0.026) 
Project fixed effects yes  yes  yes yes 
Observations 530,229  530,229  199,604 199,604 
R-squared 0.041    0.040   
Number of projects 31,926 31,926 12,378 12,378 
Notes: a) Our sample is only limited to projects with only one winner. b) Log (bidder 
tenure month) is not included in our model Robust standard errors clustered by projects 
are reported in parentheses; c) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Figure 2. Marginal Effect of the “Homecountry” 
Dummy on Winning Probability  
6.1. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects in 
Different Sub-categories 
In our main analysis, we found that employers hold 
home bias and the bias becomes weaker after the 
implementation of the monitoring system. In line with 
this finding, we expect that the magnitude of such a 
change should be contingent on the observability of the 
project performance and the effectiveness of the 
monitoring system. As such, we should observe a more 
significant effect of the implementation of the 
monitoring system in projects whose outcomes are 
easier to be tracked by the monitoring system. For 
projects relying on creative thinking or background 
9 (0.654-0.301)/0.654*100%=54.0% 
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operations, the impact of monitoring might be very 
limited. Therefore, we explore the heterogeneous 
treatment effects in top 5 subcategories ranked by the 
number of projects. Among these five subcategories, 
two subcategories are expected to be easier to monitor 
(html and html5) based on our interviews with 
programmers. Overall, we find that the implementation 
of the monitoring system effectively reduces employers’ 
home bias in these two subcategories (html and html5) 
but not in the other three ones. Therefore, the result 
supports the causal relationship between monitoring and 
the weakened home bias. 
Table 6. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 
Subcategory     HTML Wordpress MySQL jQuery / Prototype HTML5 
Model    LPM LPM LPM LPM LPM 
Homecountry 0.027*** 0.012 0.029* 0.023 -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.016) (0.023) (0.018) 
Time_based× 
Homecountry 0.048** 0.001 0.092 0.040 0.177*** 
 (0.019) (0.040) (0.066) (0.064) (0.060) 
After×Homeco
untry 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.053** 
 (0.006) (0.017) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) 
Time_based ×After ×Homecountry -0.040* -0.032 -0.018 -0.018 -0.193** 
 (0.023) (0.056) (0.079) (0.087) (0.076) 
Bidder 
developed 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Log (bid price) -0.060*** -0.072*** -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.061*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Log (milestone 
percentage) -0.002** -0.006*** -0.006** 0.004 -0.007** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log (count 
rating) 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (bid order 
rank) -0.002*** -0.017*** -0.005** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Preferred 
freelancer 0.009*** 0.015*** -0.002 0.008 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Project fixed 
effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 339,899 46,986 39,271 22,890 21,696 
R-squared 0.032 0.038 0.048 0.040 0.032 
Number of 
projects 15,503 2,482 2,904 1,728 1,239 
7. Robustness Check 
7.1. Alternative Models 
In the main analysis, we employ both the LPM and 
Logit models to explore employers’ hiring decisions by 
balancing multiple workers’ characteristics and bid 
prices, etc. To verify the robustness of our results, we 
follow the model in the previous discrimination 
literature by including the worker-specific fixed-effects 
[8] and tracking the change in the effect of 
the	!"#$4"WK52X,-	dummy. Specifically, based on the 
covariates listed in the Propensity Score Matching 
section (except for the month dummies), we match time-
                                                
10 To save the computation time, we employ the LPM to estimate the 
placebo treatment effects. 
based projects posted prior to the implementation of the 
monitoring system with those time-based projects 
posted after its implementation. We compare the impact 
of !"#$4"WK52X,- dummy on the probability of bidder 
j being hired by the employer of project i (Pr	(!;2$,-Y)) 
before and after within the full sample and the matched 
sample. 12(!;2$,-Y) = ?- + AB!"#$4"WK52X,- + ACHI5$2,+ 	AGHI5$2,×!"#$4"WK52X,-+ 4"K52"LF :;99$2- + ZY + N-Y  
where ?- denotes bidder-specific fixed-effects. The 
notations of all the other covariates are similar to those 
in the main result. Additionally, we also control for the 
time fixed-effects and cluster the standard errors by 
workers instead of projects. Further, following Åslund 
et al. [8], we estimate the change in workers’ probability 
of being hired in the Linear Probability Model. As Table 
6 shows, after the monitoring system implementation, 
the positive effect of the !"#$4"WK52X,- dummy on 
the probability of being hired significantly decreases, 
which is highly consistent with our main result. 
7.2. Placebo Tests 
To reinforce the credibility of our main finding, we 
conduct two additional placebo tests. First, we assign a 
placebo intervention to the middle of our pre-treatment 
period (August 1st, 2013) and check whether there exists 
a pre-treatment decrease tendency in home bias prior to 
the actual implementation of monitoring systems. We 
find that the interaction between the “pseudo” HI5$2 
dummy and the E;#$_:7F$9	dummy is insignificant. 
Second, following Abadie et al. [58], we randomly 
reassign the treatment to the projects and run the same 
model with the placebo treatment assignment. We 
replicate the analysis for 100 times10 and generate the 
distribution of placebo treatment effects based on the 
“pseudo” treatments of monitoring intervention. By 
comparing the estimated coefficient of three key 
covariates to the whole distribution of “placebo” 
treatment effects, we find that it is unlikely to observe a 
similar size of treatment effect by chance, which lends 
support to the causal relationship between monitoring 
and the drop in home bias. 
7.3. Other Analyses 
To further check the robustness of our conclusions, 
we conduct additional analyses which are suppressed 
because of the limitation of length. First, we rerun the 
model with a shorter range of observational window 
(night months before and after; six months before and 
after) and still find a consistent result. Second, we 
conduct a falsification test based on employers’ project 
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experience. We expect that employers who have never 
posted a time-based project should not be affected by 
the implementation of the monitoring system. Hence, 
we rerun the model with employers with no time-based 
project experience and find their home bias doesn’t 
decrease. Third, to ensure the workers are comparable 
and similar between the treatment group and the control 
group, we limit our sample to the bids which are 
submitted by those workers who bid for both fixed-price 
and time-based projects. The result of the restricted 
sample is still highly consistent with our main findings. 
8. Discussion 
8.1. Key Findings and Implications 
Based on a quasi-natural experiment wherein the 
platform introduces a monitoring system for time-based 
projects, we explore the existence of employers’ 
preference for workers from their home countries and 
the change in their preference after the implementation 
of the monitoring system. First, our estimation results 
suggest that there exists a home bias towards workers in 
online employment. Second, the monitoring system 
implementation reduces the ex post information 
asymmetry regarding hidden actions and lowers 
employers’ home bias. Based on the different 
predictions from taste-based discrimination and 
statistical discrimination assumptions, we suggest that 
employers’ home bias is more likely to be driven by 
statistical discrimination.  
We add to the previous literature in three ways. First, 
this is the first study that confirms the existence of home 
bias in online employment. Despite the rich literature on 
home bias in equity and trade, the existence of home 
bias in online employment remains an open question. 
Åslund et al.’s [8] study might be the most relevant 
paper to ours. They found that immigrant managers 
show less discrimination against immigrant applicants 
in Sweden. However, given that their limited data from 
only one country, they could not disentangle the impact 
of the similar immigrant identity on hiring decisions 
from that of home bias. Moreover, they also failed to 
control for the informational difference between 
immigrant managers and native managers. Second, we 
also contribute to the emerging stream of research on the 
discrimination studies based on dynamic predictions 
and quasi-experiments [33, 34]. By now, the most 
popular method applied in discrimination studies is 
audit test [32]. However, as listed by Heckman and 
Siegelman [59] and Heckman [31], the audit studies 
suffer from the fact that the differences between the 
auditors in a pair are not well controlled or perfectly 
manipulated, and the non-double-blind research setting 
[32]. As Rubineau and Kang [33] stated, “The key to 
identifying statistical discrimination lies in scrutinizing 
its dynamic rather than static predictions.”  By 
checking the consistency between the predictions based 
on statistical discrimination assumption and the actual 
observed result, we could build a more robust causal 
relationship between the information change and the 
dynamic change in discrimination, and subsequently 
identify the mechanism of discrimination. Third, our 
paper also contributes to the recent research on the 
discrimination phenomenon in the “Gig” economy. It 
has been found that there exists racial discrimination in 
on-demand short-term accommodation service [22] and 
on-demand E-hailing service [21]. We contribute to this 
stream of discrimination literature by showing that the 
discrimination based on the similarity of the home 
country is also one prevalent discrimination in the “Gig” 
economy. Our study suggests that by improving some 
platform-level information policies, we could increase 
the fairness of the “Gig” economy without reducing the 
market efficiency. Specifically, “Gig” economy 
platforms could provide more IT-enabled tools to help 
to lower the information asymmetry and mitigate the 
discrimination issues. Meanwhile, high-quality workers 
from the minority group could self-signal themselves by 
providing more individual information or join those 
platforms with less information asymmetry. 
8.2. Concluding Remark 
Using a unique large-scale data set from one of the 
prevalent online labor platforms, we document the 
existence of home bias in the online employment setting 
for the first time. Moreover, owing to the quasi-natural 
experiment design, we conclude that the 
implementation of the monitoring system lowers 
employers’ home bias by 54.0%. Our result suggests 
that when information is limited, employers might 
employ statistical discrimination and prefer to hire 
workers from their home countries. This kind of 
discrimination could be alleviated without the loss of 
market efficiency if the platform makes some changes 
to its information policies and reduces the ex ante or ex 
post information asymmetry. Overall, our study 
provides support for the existence of statistical home 
bias in the context of online employment. 
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